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A hallmark of habitual actions is that, once they are established, they become insensitive 
to changes in the values of action outcomes. In this article, we review empirical research 
that examined effects of posttraining changes in outcome values in outcome-selective 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) tasks. This review suggests that cue-instigated 
action tendencies in these tasks are not affected by weak and/or incomplete revaluation 
procedures (e.g., selective satiety) and substantially disrupted by a strong and complete 
devaluation of reinforcers. In a second part, we discuss two alternative models of a 
motivational control of habitual action: a default-interventionist framework and expected 
value of control theory. It is argued that the default-interventionist framework cannot solve 
the problem of an infinite regress (i.e., what controls the controller?). In contrast, expected 
value of control can explain control of habitual actions with local computations and 
feedback loops without (implicit) references to control homunculi. It is argued that 
insensitivity to changes in action outcomes is not an intrinsic design feature of habits but, 
rather, a function of the cognitive system that controls habitual action tendencies.
Keywords: habit, outcome devaluation, Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, default-interventionist framework, 
expected value of control, cognitive control
“The chains of habit are too weak to be felt until they are too strong to be broken.” (adage 
credited to Samuel Johnson, 1748, “The vision of Theodore”)
Human beings like to view themselves as rationally behaving agents (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). 
Yet, we  are also creatures of habit. Accordingly, scientists in many different fields have been 
attracted to the study of habits because they invoke a dichotomy between automatic and controlled 
behavior (Wood and Rünger, 2016). A popular view is that habits run on autopilot until 
something goes wrong. For an illustration, let us take the example of our fictitious friend Tom: 
when he  comes home from work, he  has the habit to grab a can of cold beer from the fridge 
and to enjoy his after-work beer. On one unfortunate day, his wife bought the wrong beer, 
and the drama unfolds: Tom takes his usual large gulp, grimaces in distaste, and the moment 
is spoiled. What will happen to Tom? Will he  continue with drinking, even if he  cannot have 
his favorite beer? Maybe at a reduced rate? Or does he  stop beer drinking all at once?
These questions are far from trivial, because behavior analysts commonly agree that habitual 
action is in principle and by definition independent of the current value of the produced 
outcome (see the next section). Yet, it is also clear that most people can control and correct 
habitual actions to some degree if the outcome is dysfunctional. In fact, a persistent inability 
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to correct for unwanted habitual action patterns is a hallmark 
of a variety of pathological states (e.g., addiction)—and hence 
the atypical outcome of action control in healthy adults.
This article reviews research on the motivational control of 
habitual action. In a first section, we  will discuss insensitivity 
to changes in action outcomes as a defining feature of habitual 
actions. Then, we  will review behavioral and neuroscientific 
studies that examined a goal-independency of cue-instigated 
action tendencies with posttraining outcome revaluation 
procedures in operant learning and outcome-selective Pavlovian-
to-instrumental transfer (PIT) tasks. In the second part, we will 
discuss two theoretical accounts: a default-interventionist 
framework and expected value of control (EVC) theory. While 
both accounts can explain a motivational control of habitual 
action, we  will argue that EVC theory has more potential to 
provide a convincing account of habit control in PIT tasks.
PART I
Dual Action Psychology: Habitual and 
Goal-Directed Actions
According to behavior analysts, a habit is an acquired behavior 
that is triggered by an antecedent stimulus (Dickinson, 1985). 
Habit is distinguished from goal-directed action that is controlled 
by the current value of the action goal through knowledge 
about the instrumental relations between the action and its 
consequences. Often implicit to this distinction is an assignment 
of features of automaticity (e.g., associative, unintentional, 
efficient, etc.) to habitual actions and features of non-automaticity 
(e.g., rule-based, intentional, capacity-limited, etc.) to goal-
directed actions (Dickinson and Balleine, 1993). However, close 
scrutiny of this distinction makes clear that this dichotomy 
is not justified and too simple (for thorough discussions, see 
Bargh, 1994; Moors and De Houwer, 2006; Keren and Schul, 
2009; for counterarguments, see Evans and Stanovich, 2013). 
More useful seems a functional distinction based on correlations 
between actions and context features and correlations between 
actions and valued outcomes: instrumental actions are goal-
directed because they are correlated more strongly with the 
presence or absence of desired outcomes than with the presence 
of particular contexts or stimuli. For example, if Tom drinks 
his after-work beer because he  has a desire to get drunk, 
he  would be  willing to consume another alcoholic beverage 
if it has the same intoxicant effect. Habitual action, by contrast, 
is correlated more strongly with context features than with 
the presence or absence of a particular outcome of the action. 
For example, Tom would drink his after-work beer even if 
he  is not thirsty or keen on getting drunk. For him, it is a 
behavioral routine that becomes activated in the appropriate 
context. That means, he  would not have drunk the beer at 
another time or place, and assuming that he  has developed 
a habit of beer drinking, even not another beverage.
At this point, a few additional qualifications are necessary. 
First, the correlation of habitual actions with particular contexts 
(or states) does not mean that they are unrelated to the value 
of these contexts. Habits typically arise from frequent repetitions 
of previously rewarded (instrumental) actions, that means, they 
often have a strong reward history (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). 
This rewarding context does not change with the performance 
of a habitual action (“Tom still gets drunk after beer 
consumption”) but, rather, the internal representation of this 
state as action outcome has changed (“getting drunk is a 
by-product and not an intended consequence anymore”). 
Complicating things further, a similar point can be  made in 
respect to a correlation between instrumental actions and context 
features. Goal-directed actions are situated in particular contexts 
that offer a variety of informative cues for action control. 
Organisms exploit these cues in their active pursuit of a valued 
outcome and, if encountered on a regular basis, the action is 
correlated with the presence and absence of these contextual 
cues. Taken together, this means that a functional distinction 
between habitual and goal-directed actions based on the relative 
strength of correlations is gradual—and not a categorical one.
Second, for the analysis of a goal-dependency of actions, 
it is meaningful to distinguish between proximal and distal 
outcomes of actions. According to the standard definition, 
habitual action is not controlled by the value of proximal 
outcomes (“Tom does not drink his after-work beer because 
of the good taste of the beer”); however, the context in which 
the habit is performed is controlled by outcomes that are more 
distally related to the habitual behavior (e.g., “Tom wants to 
enjoy his leisure time and beer drinking serves this goal”). 
Thus, distal consequences can be  causally involved in the 
performance of a habitual action even if its performance is 
insensitive to its immediate outcome. Note that this relationship 
implies a roughly hierarchical structure in which the habit 
(“beer drinking”) is nested in a more abstract and/or temporally 
extended activity (“enjoyment of the evening”). In the following, 
we mean an insensitivity to immediate outcomes when referring 
to a goal-independency of habits.
Goal-Independency of Habits
Having laid out what habitual actions are, we now discuss studies 
examining a goal-independency of habitual actions. Given the 
extensive research literature on habit acquisition and performance, 
this review is necessarily selective. In the following, we  will 
focus on laboratory studies with humans and animals in which 
reinforcing stimuli were devalued after extensive instrumental 
training. For example, devaluation treatments could be the pairing 
of a food reinforcer with toxin, or the devaluation of a monetary 
reinforcer. Critically, this devaluation was done after reinforcement 
learning; consequently, the value of the reinforcer was changed 
in the absence of the associated action. Following devaluation, 
action performance was tested in extinction (i.e., without 
presentation of the reinforcer that would have allowed for new 
reinforcement learning). If the animal or human continued to 
perform the behavior which had produced the now-devalued 
reinforcer, it was concluded that the motivation to perform this 
action was not driven by the current value of the reinforcer 
(i.e., action outcome)—and hence habitual.
First, it should be noted that many studies with posttraining 
devaluations of action outcomes found that actions 
do not become habitual even after extensive training 
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(e.g., Adams and Dickinson, 1981). For example, a classic 
study trained rats to perform two distinct actions, each 
reinforced by a unique food reward (Colwill and Rescorla, 
1985). After extensive training, one reward was devalued by 
pairing it with a toxin (flavor-aversion conditioning). Then, 
the animal was given the opportunity to engage in each of 
the responses in extinction. The study showed that the 
postlearning devaluation of the food reinforcer selectively 
reduced working for that food. Obviously, the rat had retrieved 
a memory of the devalued food outcome during the extinction 
test, in contradiction to early views that the reinforcer becomes 
not encoded in associative stimulus-response structures 
controlling reinforced behaviors (Thorndike, 1911; Hull, 1931). 
On the other hand, working for the devalued outcome was 
often not completely abolished in this research, which was 
viewed as evidence for habit formation. However, caution 
is warranted with this interpretation. First, other factors 
besides context features could have motivated the residual 
performance. For instance, the animal could have tested out 
whether the action will continue to produce no reinforcer 
in the extinction test (see research on the so-called “extinction 
burst”; Lerman and Iwata, 1995). Second, the devaluation 
of the reinforcer was most typically incomplete (Colwill and 
Rescorla, 1990). We  will come back to this issue when 
we  discuss the effectiveness of outcome devaluation 
treatments below.
Subsequent studies examined more specific conditions in 
which instrumental performance becomes insensitive to outcome 
values. This research suggested that overtraining, single-response 
training regimes, and interval-based reinforcement schedules 
(relative to a fixed-ratio schedule) are conducive to habit 
formation (e.g., Dickinson et  al., 1983; Tricomi et  al., 2009; 
Kosaki and Dickinson, 2010). However, even these protocols 
do not invariably lead to an insensitivity outcome values (for 
a recent failure, see de Wit et  al., 2018) and the conditions 
necessary for habit formation are still not very well understood 
(Hogarth, 2018). Most important, the ideal “habit test” examines 
not only an insensitivity to correlations with (de)valued outcomes 
but also a sensitivity to correlations with context features. This 
test is found in a procedure called outcome-selective Pavlovian-
to-instrumental transfer of control (PIT).
In outcome-selective PIT, stimuli that are predictive of 
specific outcomes prime instrumental responses that are 
associated with these outcomes. The canonical procedure is 
shown in Figure 1 and consists of three separate phases: an 
a first Pavlovian training phase, participants learn predictive 
relations between stimuli and differential outcomes (e.g., 
S1-O1, S2-O2). In a subsequent instrumental training phase, 
they learn to produce these outcomes with particular actions 
(e.g., R1-O1, R2-O2). In a transfer test, both actions are 
then made available in extinction, and the preference for a 
specific action is measured in the presence of each conditioned 
stimulus (i.e., S1: R1 or R2?; S2: R1 or R2?). The typical 
result is a preference for the action whose outcome was 
signaled by the Pavlovian cue (i.e., S1: R1 > R2; S2: R2 > R1), 
suggesting that this stimulus has gained control over responding 
(for a review and meta-analysis, see Holmes et  al., 2010; 
FIGURE 1 | Pavlovian, instrumental, and transfer phases in the outcome-
selective PIT paradigm. S, stimulus cue; R, response; O, outcome. The 
animal shows no preference for a particular outcome (here: two flavors of 
cheese) before the training. In the transfer test, the response associated with 
the same outcome as the stimulus cue is typically preferred (i.e., S1: R1 > R2; 
S2: R2 > R1). See the text for more explanation.
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Cartoni et  al., 2016). Note that this cue-instigated action 
tendency cannot be  explained with rote S-R learning because 
the action was not paired with the Pavlovian cue before the 
transfer test. Instead, it has been suggested that the Pavlovian 
cue primes the action by activating the sensory representation 
of the associated outcome via an associative S:(R-O) or S:(O-R) 
chain (Trapold and Overmier, 1972; Asratyan, 1974; Balleine 
and Ostlund, 2007; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009). According 
to this account, the Pavlovian cue activates a cognitive 
representation of the identity of the outcome (whatever its 
value), and this activation excites the action that is associated 
with the same outcome. In line with an associative S-O-R 
mechanism, research on “ideomotor effects” showed that 
presentations of action effect-related stimuli prime actions 
producing these effects (for reviews, see Shin et  al., 2010; 
Hommel, 2013). An alternative account proposed that the 
Pavlovian cues act like discriminative stimuli in a hierarchical 
network that signal when a specific R-O relationship is in 
effect (Cartoni et  al., 2013; Hogarth et  al., 2014). According 
to this account, action choice in PIT tasks is driven by 
participants’ explicit beliefs about which action is more likely 
reinforced in the presence of a specific cue. For instance, 
participants in one experiment were told that the cues presented 
during a PIT test would indicate which action would not 
be  rewarded. This instruction reversed the cue-instigated 
action tendency (Seabrooke et  al., 2016). A follow-up study 
found this reversed PIT effect abolished by a cognitive load 
manipulation, while the standard PIT effect was spared 
(Seabrooke et  al., 2019b). This research suggests that several 
processes could contribute to outcome-selective PIT effects: 
a resource-dependent one that is highly amenable to 
instructions, and a relatively resource-independent one that 
could be  an association-based mechanism or a very simple 
behavioral rule. It should be  noted that outcome-selective 
PIT effects were also observed in rodent studies, and it has 
been argued that the underlying mechanisms are causally 
involved in a broad range of “habitual” behaviors (Everitt 
and Robbins, 2005; Watson et  al., 2012; Hogarth et  al., 2013; 
Colagiuri and Lovibond, 2015).
Importantly, the outcome-selective PIT task can be combined 
with outcome devaluation treatments to examine a goal-
independency of cue-instigated action tendencies. Using this 
research approach, animal studies found that rodents still work 
harder for a devalued food in the presence of a Pavlovian or 
discriminative cue associated with that food (Rescorla, 1994; 
Corbit and Balleine, 2005; Corbit et  al., 2007). For example, 
in one study (Holland, 2004), hungry rats learned relations 
between stimuli and two unique food rewards (sucrose and 
food pellets). These food rewards were then used to reinforce 
two distinct actions (chain pulling and lever presses). In a 
subsequent extinction test, the rats had access to these responses 
during presentations of the Pavlovian cues. Performance in 
this first transfer test showed a standard outcome-selective 
PIT effect. After this test, one of the two food rewards was 
devalued by pairing it with a toxin. Then, the rats worked on 
a second transfer test in extinction. Although the conditioned 
food aversion clearly decreased working for that food at baseline, 
the cue-instigated action tendency augmenting the devalued 
response was spared.
Results of outcome-selective PIT studies with human adults 
were however more mixed. While some studies confirmed the 
finding of animal studies that reinforcer-selective PIT does 
not change when the outcome is no longer desirable (Hogarth 
and Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 2012; Watson et  al., 2014; van 
Steenbergen et  al., 2017; De Tommaso et  al., 2018), a few 
studies observed a change. One of these studies used a stock-
market paradigm for a postlearning devaluation of outcomes 
(Allman et  al., 2010). Human adults first learned to associate 
specific symbols and instrumental actions with two (fictitious) 
money currencies. In this phase of the experiment, both 
currencies had the same value, and participants knew that 
they can swap the earnings into real money after the study. 
In a first extinction test, a clear PIT effect was observed. After 
retraining, and immediately before a second transfer test, one 
of the two currencies was devalued by making the currency 
worthless. In the subsequent extinction test, responding for 
the intact currency was still elevated by matching cues; in 
contrast, working for the devalued money was generally disrupted 
and not affected by presentations of a matching cue. In short, 
the Pavlovian cue had lost its capacity to excite the 
devalued action.
Follow-up research showed that the cue-instigated action 
tendency is affected by a postlearning value decrease, but not 
by an equidistant value increase (Eder and Dignath, 2016a). 
The study used a stock-market paradigm similar to Allman 
et  al. (2010). This time, however, the revaluation treatment 
involved three monetary outcomes: one currency was made 
worthless as in Allman et  al. by decreasing its value by one 
unit (1  →  0); the value of another currency was doubled 
(1  →  2); the third currency maintained its value (1  →  1) for 
baseline comparisons. If the cue-instigated action tendency is 
truly sensitive to the current value of outcomes, then it should 
decrease following the devaluation but increase following the 
upvaluation of the outcome. Results however showed that only 
the devaluation treatment had an effect: Outcome-selective PIT 
was significantly reduced after devaluation, reproducing the 
result of Allman et  al. (2010). In contrast, PIT effects were 
not different from the baseline condition after the upvaluation. 
In short, only a decrease in the outcome value affected 
cue-instigated action tendencies, while an equidistant value 
increase had no effect.
The PIT studies reviewed above are puzzling and at odds 
with a large number of studies that reported no effect of 
postlearning changes in outcome values. In the search for 
an explanation, Watson and colleagues proposed that the 
stock-market paradigm involved highly abstract representations 
of values that were presumably more accessible to explicit 
choice strategies (Watson et  al., 2018). While it is unclear 
why those explicit decision rules should not take a value 
increment into account (see Eder and Dignath, 2016a), recent 
studies confirmed that explicit beliefs can have a profound 
impact on outcome-selective PIT effects (see e.g., Seabrooke 
et  al., 2016). In addition, the theoretical argument was made 
that Pavlovian cues can only activate the sensory identity of 
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action outcomes in PIT tasks and not their value (Balleine 
and Ostlund, 2007; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009). If money 
outcomes in the stock-market studies were represented 
predominantly in terms of their value, this could have made 
a critical difference to (animal) studies that used primary 
reinforcers with a more detailed sensory representation. 
Accordingly, it could be  hypothesized that a standard PIT 
task with food outcomes should be not sensitive to postlearning 
changes in the values of outcomes.
Eder and Dignath (2016b) tested this hypothesis with 
liquid reinforcers. Participants were trained in separate sessions 
to associate specific symbols and keypresses, respectively, with 
red and yellow lemonades. Importantly, participants in this 
study were asked to consume the lemonades earned during 
a transfer test1. After having worked on a first transfer test, 
one of the lemonades was devalued with bad-tasting Tween20. 
Then, a second transfer test was performed. Each transfer 
test was further subdivided into two test blocks. In the first 
experiment, participants consumed the earned lemonades 
immediately after each test block. In the second experiment, 
consumption was not immediate, and participants could take 
the earned lemonades with them in bottles. Figure 2 shows 
the response rates in both experiments as a function of the 
Pavlovian cue in each test block. As can be  seen, a strong 
and robust PIT effect was observed in both experiments 
before devaluation: working for a specific lemonade was 
elevated by presentations of cues associated with that lemonade 
(relative to a baseline condition with a neutral cue associated 
with no lemonade). However, response rates changed 
dramatically following the devaluation. Participants now 
preferred the action that produced the intact lemonade. 
Responding for this lemonade was still augmented by a 
matching cue relative to baseline. In contrast, the cue-instigated 
action tendency was abolished for the devalued response in 
Experiment 1  in which the liquids earned in a test block 
were consumed immediately. Interestingly, in Experiment 2 
(without immediate consumption of the liquids), the 
cue-instigated tendency for the devalued response was abolished 
in the first test block only and restored in the second test 
block2. It is plausible that the immediate consumption of 
the drinks increased the motivational relevance of the devalued 
drink. These results hence show that a strong devaluation 
treatment of food outcomes can also reduce cue-instigated 
action tendencies operating on a primary reinforcer.
1 The transfer test was carried out in nominal extinction (i.e., without feedback 
whether or which lemonade had been earned). This was done to prevent the 
feedback from influencing the response choice. Instruction explicitly stated 
that the actions during the transfer test procure lemonades (2.5  ml according 
to the fixed-ratio 9 schedule) and that the probability of a reward is not 
influenced by the pictures presented during this phase. Note that a reward 
expectancy during the extinction test is common in PIT studies (see e.g., 
Hogarth and Chase, 2011; Colagiuri and Lovibond, 2015). Furthermore, it 
increases the ecological validity of the PIT task to behavior outside of the 
laboratory (for a discussion of this point see Lovibond and Colagiuri, 2013).
2 Collapsed across both test blocks, however, there was small PIT effect for the 
devalued response. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the PIT effects for the 
devalued response in both test blocks were not significantly different.
For an explanation, Eder and Dignath (2016b) suggested 
that only strong devaluation treatments suppress cue-instigated 
instigated actions. In fact, most studies that found no effect 
of the devaluation treatment used rather weak and/or incomplete 
devaluation treatments, such as ad libitum feeding, conditioning 
of a taste aversion, or health warnings (for a similar 
argumentation, see De Houwer et  al., 2018)3. Hogarth and 
Chase (2011), for instance, used a specific satiety procedure 
to devalue a tobacco outcome. Although smoking a cigarette 
before a transfer test reduced participants’ craving and working 
for cigarettes during the PIT test, cue-instigated action 
tendencies for that reward were not affected. Critically, working 
for the devalued tobacco outcome (irrespective of the cue) 
was still on a high level (>40%), suggesting that the devaluation 
was not very strong. In addition, regular smokers typically 
know that the state of satiety is only temporary. Therefore, 
it could be argued that working for cigarettes was still attractive 
for them during the transfer test. The devaluation treatment 
that is most comparable to the one used by Eder and Dignath 
(2016b) is conditioning of a taste aversion. Rodent studies 
often devalued a food reinforcer by pairing it with lithium 
chloride (LiCl) inducing sickness (e.g., Rescorla, 1994; Holland, 
2004). Although LiCl-conditioning has a strong and lasting 
effect on the consumption of that food, the devaluation is 
often incomplete, because the animal must approach a magazine 
to consume the poisoned food and could reject consumption 
before the devaluation was complete. In fact, when Colwill 
and Rescorla (1990) used a standard procedure to devalue a 
sucrose solution with LiCl-injections before a transfer test, 
the devaluation treatment did not eliminate the cue-instigated 
action tendency. However, when the poisoned sucrose solution 
was injected directly into the mouth of the rat during 
conditioning, the stimulus lost its capacity to elevate the 
devalued response. Thus, animal research also found 
cue-instigated action tendencies abolished after a strong and 
immediate devaluation treatment, in line with the results of 
human studies reviewed above.
Our main conclusion from this short review is that the 
cue-instigated action tendency was suppressed when the 
devaluation of the associated action outcome was strong and 
complete. This does not mean that the action tendency scales 
directly with the current value of the associate outcome, as 
proposed for a goal-directed process. In this case, studies with 
a weak (but still effective) devaluation of the outcome should 
also have observed a reduction in cue-instigated tendencies, 
which was not the case (e.g., Hogarth and Chase, 2011; 
Watson et  al., 2014; De Tommaso et  al., 2018). In addition, an 
3 A notable exception is Experiment 1  in Seabrooke et  al. (2017) that showed 
a PIT effect despite the use of a fairly strong devaluation treatment (coating 
of snacks with a distasteful paste). It should be  noted, however, that (1) this 
study presented pictures of the food outcomes (and not Pavlovian cues) during 
the transfer test; (2) despite a clear reduction in subjective liking ratings, 
working for the devalued food (in the baseline condition) was still on a sizeable 
level (~25%); (3) the devalued food earned during the test was not immediately 
consumed (see Eder and Dignath, 2016b); (4) the same devaluation treatment 
affected PIT tendencies in subsequent experiments after modification of the 
task procedure (Seabrooke et  al., 2017, 2019a).
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upvaluation of the associated outcome should have enhanced 
the cue-instigated action tendency, which was not observed 
(Eder and Dignath, 2016a). In short, the studies reviewed above 
do not question that the cue-instigated action tendency was 
“habitual” in the sense that the behavior was insensitive to 
the current value of the outcome; rather, they suggest that the 
habitual action tendency was cognitively suppressed because the 
devalued outcome was in conflict with other goals or intentions. 
According to this interpretation, an internal conflict signal is 
created after registration that the present state will deteriorate 
markedly with continued performance of the habitual action. 
Detection of this conflict signal then triggers behavioral adaptations 
that aim to correct for the maladaptive habitual response. In 
the next section, we  will describe two frameworks of how such 
a control system could be  implemented on the cognitive level: 
a default-interventionist framework and EVC theory.
PART II
In this part, we  will discuss two alternative frameworks of 
cognitive control: (1) a default-interventionist framework that 
A
B
FIGURE 2 | Response ratios in Eder and Dignath (2016b) before and after the devaluation of a liquid reinforcer as a function of stimulus cue, action, and test block 
in Experiment 1 (upper panel A) and Experiment 2 (lower panel B). S, stimulus cue; R, response; dev, devalued outcome. *significant difference to the baseline 
condition at p < 0.05.
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proposes a higher order cognitive control system that intervenes 
when the habitual action goes faulty. (2) EVC theory that 
explains the allocation of control with neural computations of 
the expected payoffs from engaging in cognitive control.
Default-Interventionist Framework
The default-interventionist framework postulates a cognitive 
control system that can intervene when the habitual “default” 
response becomes inappropriate, cumbersome, or defective. 
In its most basic form, the framework assumes two systems 
or control units of actions: a habitual controller and a 
goal-directed controller. Only the goal-directed controller is 
sensitive to changes in outcomes, while the habitual controller 
implements a stimulus-driven behavior without detailed 
representation of its consequences. This distinction is supported 
by neurophysiological research that studied dissociations in 
the control of voluntary and habitual actions on a neural 
systems level. More specifically, habitual and goal-directed 
controllers have been linked to two distinct (but interacting) 
cortico-basal ganglia networks in the brain: The associative 
cortico-basal ganglia loop controls goal-directed actions via 
projections from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) to the caudate 
nucleus and the anterior putamen. The sensorimotor loop 
controls habitual actions and connects the somatosensory 
and motor cortex with the medial and posterior putamen 
(for reviews, see Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine et  al., 
2007; Graybiel and Grafton, 2015). Research found that after 
overtraining of a response (i.e., habit formation), neural 
activation is shifted from the associative loop to the 
sensorimotor loop (Ashby et  al., 2010). Interestingly, goal-
oriented behavior can be  reinstated after inactivation of the 
infralimibic prefrontal cortex in the rodent brain (Coutureau 
and Killcross, 2003). This finding suggests that the circuits 
controlling goal-directed behavior are actively suppressed after 
habit formation.
The default-interventionist framework rests on the idea 
that there is a dynamic balance between action control 
systems, and that control could be  shifted back from the 
habitual to the goal-directed control system if needed. This 
idea also fits with the long-standing view that prefrontal 
cortical areas have the capacity to override unwanted lower-
order action tendencies (Koechlin et  al., 2003). However, it 
has been argued that regaining control over habitual action 
tendencies is effortful and requires cognitive resources 
(Baddeley, 1996; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). Furthermore, 
the person must be  sufficiently motivated to invest resources 
in the executive control of the habitual action (Inzlicht and 
Schmeichel, 2012). Hence, a number of requirements must 
be met for the default-interventionist framework (for a defense 
and criticisms of this view, see Evans and Stanovich, 2013; 
Kruglanski, 2013; Hommel and Wiers, 2017; Melnikoff and 
Bargh, 2018).
It is likely that these conditions were met in the posttraining 
devaluation studies reviewed above. With a strong and complete 
devaluation of the outcome, participants were arguably motivated 
to avoid that outcome. In addition, performing the free-operant 
transfer task was very easy and without time pressure. However, 
the explanatory problems with the default-interventionist 
framework are much more fundamental and concern the very 
architecture of this account. Specifically, it is not specified 
what controls the controller, leading to an infinite logical 
regress. This problem became apparent in early accounts that 
conceptualized the interventionist as a unitary system 
(supervisory attentional system, working memory system, goal-
directed action controller, etc.,). This approach was heavily 
criticized of introducing a “homunculus” (the executive 
controller) that pulls the levers to regulate lower levels if 
needed (Monsell and Driver, 2000). As a reaction to this 
criticism, the unitary control system view was replaced by 
more complex models that decomposed the “executive” in 
more specific control functions (e.g., mental set shifting, memory 
updating, response suppression; Miyake et al., 2000). However, 
as Verbruggen et al. (2014) unerringly pointed out, this approach 
only resulted in a multiplication of control homunculi and 
not in an explanation of how control is exercised. Thus, a 
fundamentally different approach is needed that explains 
cognitive control functions as an emergent phenomenon of 
the cognitive system.
Expected Value of Control
A model that has the potential to explain habit control in 
the PIT paradigm without recourse to control homunculi is 
found in EVC theory (Shenhav et al., 2013, 2016). This model 
analyzes cognitive control as a domain of reward-based decision 
making; that means, it is assumed that cognitive control 
functions serve to maximize desired outcomes through 
“controlled” processes when those outcomes could not otherwise 
be  achieved by (habitual) “default” processes (Botvinick and 
Braver, 2015). The model aims to explain whether, where, 
and how much cognitive control is allocated to ongoing or 
planned activities. At the neural level, it is assumed that a 
central hub in this decision making process is the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) that lies on the medial 
surfaces of the brain’s frontal lobes (see the central panel in 
Figure 3). Many studies showed that the dACC becomes 
active in control-demanding situations in which automatic 
action tendencies, such as habits, are in conflict with task-
defined responses (see e.g., Procyk et  al., 2000; for meta-
analyses see Ridderinkhof et  al., 2004; Nee et  al., 2007). As 
a key hub in a wide network of distributed brain regions, 
it receives inputs from brain areas responsible for the valuation 
of incoming stimuli or action outcomes and sends output 
signals to areas responsible for the implementation of control 
(see Figure 3). In this network, it is assumed that dACC 
serves several functions: (1) it monitors ongoing processing 
to signal the need for control; (2) it evaluates the demands 
for control; (3) and it allocates control to downstream regions 
(Botvinick, 2007; Shenhav et al., 2016); for a different account 
of dACC functions, see Kolling et  al., 2016).
According to EVC theory, two sources of value-related 
information are integrated in the dACC: (1) what control 
signal should be  selected (i.e., its identity) and (2) how 
vigorously this control signal should be  engaged (i.e., its 
intensity). The integration process considers the overall payoff 
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that can be expected from engaging in a given control signal, 
taking into account the probabilities of positive and negative 
consequences that could result from performing a task. In 
addition, it takes into account that there is an intrinsic cost 
to engaging in control itself, which is a monotonic function 
of the intensity of the control signal (Shenhav et  al., 2017). 
The expected value of a candidate control signal is the sum 
of its anticipated payoffs (weighted by their respective 
probabilities) minus the inherent cost of the signal (a function 
of its intensity). By relative comparisons, the candidate control 
signal with the maximum expected value is selected for a 
down-stream regulation of more basic processes. This selection 
process has been simulated as a stochastic evidence 
accumulation process using the drift diffusion model that 
avoids any recourse to a homunculus (Musslick et  al., 2015). 
In contrast to the default-interventionist framework, EVC 
theory does not assume a hierarchy of action control systems 
but, rather, views the control of habitual actions as an emergent 
phenomenon of a unitary cognitive system. In addition, neural 
computations of the expected payoffs are continuously 
performed during task engagement, and control (e.g., attention) 
can be  applied in varying degrees to the task at hand. It 
should be noted that the hypothesis of a neural implementation 
in the dACC is in principle independent of the computations 
proposed by the theory on the algorithmic level (Marr, 1982). 
In other words, it is possible that future neuroscientific research 
will identify other neural structures that calculate expected 
payoffs of engaging in control. By providing a computationally 
coherent and mechanistically explicit account of cognitive 
control functions on the algorithmic and implementational 
levels, EVC theory avoids the pitfall of introducing a new 
homunculus-like entity that magically guides cognition 
and behavior.
EVC theory can account for cognitive control functions 
and subsequent control adaptations in classic response conflict 
tasks (Ridderinkhof et  al., 2004; Carter and van Veen, 2007; 
Nee et  al., 2007), and the model was also used to explain 
behavioral flexibility that is characteristic of exploration and 
foraging (Shenhav et al., 2016). Most important for the present 
discussion, EVC theory can help to understand habit control 
in PIT tasks. In the remainder of this article, we  provide a 
preliminary account of control functions in outcome-
selective PIT.
In PIT tasks, the default response that must be  potentially 
overcome is the cue-instigated action tendency that primes 
actions associated with shared outcomes. Before the revaluation 
treatment, however, there exists no motivation to override this 
default tendency. There is no action that would be more “correct” 
or valuable and that could be  increased for a better payoff. 
To the contrary, overcoming the PIT tendency would be effortful 
(for indirect evidence on this assumption, see Cavanagh et  al., 
2013; Freeman et  al., 2014; see also Yee and Braver, 2018). 
Therefore, the expected payoff does not justify the intrinsic 
cost of control. As a result, the cue-instigated action tendency 
is not or only minimally controlled in this phase, resulting 
in a PIT effect.
Expected payoffs however change dramatically after a strong 
revaluation of the outcome. Now, there exists a clear difference 
in the value of action outcomes, and response rates are adjusted 
to maximize the reward. At the computational level, this 
behavioral adjustment is implemented by prioritizing control 
signals that maximize the value of outcomes. As a consequence, 
control of action tendencies that would produce devalued 
outcomes is now justified, because the anticipated outcome of 
the intact response outweighs the effort that is necessary to 
override the devaluated response. Control is however not 
FIGURE 3 | Control allocation according to EVC theory. The dACC monitors ongoing processes for signals relevant to evaluating EVC and specifies the optimal 
control allocation to downstream regions for overriding a default behavior. OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; STN, subthalamic nucleus; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; 
PFC, prefrontal cortex. Figure reprinted by permission from Springer Nature: Nature Neuroscience, “Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the value of control”,  
© Shenhav et al. (2016).
Eder and Dignath Motivational Control of Habits
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1812
intensified following the registration of an action tendency 
that would result in high-value outcomes. As a consequence, 
the cue-instigated action tendency is only controlled 
(i.e., suppressed) if it results in a devalued outcome, whereas 
actions resulting in desirable outcomes do not (or to a much 
smaller degree) demand control.
EVC theory can hence explain why studies found reduced 
PIT tendencies only with very strong and/or complete 
devaluation treatments. The outcome value arguably shrank 
less by a weak relative to a strong devaluation treatment. 
The small decrement in the expected payoff does not justify 
the intrinsic costs of engaging in control. Furthermore, a 
EVC account of the PIT task can also explain observed effects 
that the default interventionistic account cannot explain. For 
instance, computations of expected payoffs take into account 
a temporal discounting of future and/or past outcomes (Yi 
et al., 2009). Immediate outcomes are typically weighted more 
than temporally distant outcomes. This immediacy bias can 
explain why immediate (relative to delayed) consumptions 
had a stronger effect on cue-instigated action tendencies in 
the study of Eder and Dignath (2016b). Furthermore, if the 
negative value of the devalued drink was discounted with 
the time that elapsed or will elapse since the consumption 
of that drink (Yi et  al., 2009), the expected value of engaging 
in control is the largest immediately after consumption of 
the drink. Temporal discounting of the negative outcome 
value can hence explain why PIT tendencies were abolished 
in the first test block and restored in the second test block 
of Eder and Dignath’s experiment.
EVC theory also provides an explanation why the 
postlearning devaluation of the outcome had a stronger effect 
on the control of PIT tendencies compared to the upvaluation 
(Eder and Dignath, 2016a). Research on cognitive control 
showed that negative outcomes elicit a stronger control signal 
(Hajcak et  al., 2005) and that conflict is aversive (Botvinick, 
2007; Inzlicht et  al., 2015). In line with this suggestion, 
studies found that conflict elicits a negative affective response 
(Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012) that triggers avoidance (Dignath 
et al., 2015; Dignath and Eder, 2015). In addition, (unexpected) 
positive events reduce conflict-driven behavioral adaptations, 
presumably because they weaken the negative conflict signal 
that signals need for control (e.g., van Steenbergen et  al., 
2009; but see also Dignath et  al., 2017). It is hence plausible 
that a positive affective response to the (unexpected) 
upvaluation of a currency in the study of Eder and Dignath 
(2016a) has analogously decreased the intensity of the control 
signal that signaled need for control of the cue-instigated 
action tendency.
In summary, EVC theory can explain most findings of 
the PIT studies reviewed above. While this account is ex 
post facto, it has the benefit of providing a formal and 
mechanistic account of the effect of posttraining revaluation 
treatments on PIT tendencies. In addition, the account allows 
for new predictions. According to EVC theory, cognitive 
control of cue-instigated action tendencies should be inversely 
related to the intrinsic cost of control effort. Therefore, one 
would expect that PIT tendencies should recover in demanding 
transfer tasks with high intrinsic costs of control, even when 
the devaluation of the associated outcome was very strong. 
For instance, costs of engaging in control could be manipulated 
by increasing the investment of resources that are necessary 
to reach a decision and/or to implement the action (Boureau 
et  al., 2015). These costs could be  cognitive (e.g., evaluation 
times), physical (e.g., energy expenditure), and/or emotional 
(e.g., negative affective experiences). When intrinsic costs 
outweigh the cost of producing a devalued outcome in a 
PIT task, the prediction would be that control of cue-instigated 
action tendencies becomes relaxed, resulting in larger outcome-
selective PIT effects. Having a strong foundation in 
neuroscientific research, the account also makes new predictions 
at the neural level. Specifically, activity of dACC should 
increase following the strong devaluation of an outcome, 
indexing the monitoring and implementation of a control 
setting. In addition, dACC should be  most active during 
presentations of Pavlovian cues predictive of the devalued 
outcome. Hence, several hypotheses can be  deduced from 
EVC theory that could be  examined in future research.
CONCLUSION
Habits have a great influence on our behavior. Some habits 
we strive for, and work hard to make them part of our behavioral 
repertoire. Other habits we  want to abolish because they are 
problematic. Habits are consequently closely linked to cognitive 
control functions that regulate habitual action tendencies for 
the pursuit of higher-order goals. In this article, we  argued 
on the basis of EVC theory that the allocation of control to 
habitual action tendencies is based on evaluations that compute 
the expected value of control by taking intrinsic costs of effortful 
control into account. Habits hence may be insensitive to changes 
in outcomes values because the expected benefits that follow 
from habit control do not justify the costs of control. The 
often cited insensitivity to changes in action outcomes is 
consequently not an intrinsic design feature of habits but, 
rather, a function of the cognitive system that controls habitual 
action tendencies.
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